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From the Editor

Pay For Performance
In this issue of Value Based Purchasing, we spotlight the Pay for
Performance (P4P) movement. In broad terms, P4P is a system which
rewards health care providers based on the quality and costeffectiveness of care they provide. While “pay” generally means
increased financial reimbursement, P4P programs also can reward
performance through public recognition and/or steering increased
business toward higher-performing providers. Numerous questions
have been raised about P4P, including:
•

If high-quality care is expected, is it necessary to pay bonuses
based on actual performance?

•

Will the relatively modest levels of incentives offered by many P4P
programs be enough to stimulate providers to change behaviors,
revise office systems, and invest in IT and other technologies
needed to improve performance?

•

Do we know enough about how to measure performance to have
some degree of assurance that the quality indicators being
measured are associated with better care and better outcomes?

•

Do P4P programs end up rewarding those providers who already
are providing higher-quality care, and not have an impact on
improving performance among a broader array of providers?

Reports in the published literature on the impact of P4P programs are
limited, and the evidence of their impact is mixed.
Despite these questions, the P4P movement is gathering steam. In
December of 2006, Congress passed legislation, subsequently signed
by President Bush, maintaining Medicare physician payment rates at
their present levels for 2007, and canceling a scheduled 5% reduction.
This benefit was linked, however, with a mandate for a 1.5% bonus
system to be established for physicians participating in CMS’ qualityreporting system. The Physician Voluntary Reporting Program (PVRP)
relies on physicians using a new set of billing codes. Known as Gcodes, these codes capture information on whether quality indicators,
which are not ordinarily captured through billing codes (CPT codes),
were met.

Among the 16 current PVRP quality indicators, the
majority are relevant to inpatient care. Outpatient
quality indicators include diabetes care, prevention
of falls, pharmacotherapy for patients with heart
disease, and treatment for major depression.
Although the G-code system is complicated (some
say it’s downright crazy), it speaks to government’s
newfound commitment to physician P4P, following
on CMS’ recent efforts to implement P4P for
hospitals.
It is doubtful that the federal government
would have arrived at this level of commitment to
paying for performance, were it not for the P4P
demonstration and advocacy efforts of employers
(e.g. Bridges to Excellence, Pacific Business Group
on Health, Leapfrog Rewards). Whether or not the
P4P movement ultimately leads to improved quality
and safety in health care, it stands as evidence that
the work of employers who are engaged in valuebased purchasing can impact national health policy
and stimulate innovation to address a troubled
health care system.
Neil Goldfarb, Editor
Value-Based Purchasing

VBP Interview
with Dr. Arnold Milstein
Janice L. Clarke, Managing Editor, VBP
Arnold Milstein, MD, MPH, is the Medical Director
of the Pacific Business Group on Health (PBGH),
the largest employer health care purchasing
coalition in the United States. He is also the U.S.
Health Care Thought Leader at Mercer Health &
Benefits. His work and publications focus on
private and public sector health care purchasing
strategy, clinical performance measurement, and
the psychology of clinical performance
improvement.
A co-founder of both The Leapfrog Group and the
Consumer-Purchaser Disclosure Project, Dr.
Milstein heads performance measurement activities
for both initiatives. The New England Journal of
Medicine’s series on employer sponsored health
insurance described him as a “pioneer” in efforts to

advance quality of care. In 2004 and 2005, he
received the highest annual award of World-atWork, the largest global organization of human
resource managers, and of the National Business
Group on Health (NBGH). The NBGH award cited
nationally recognized innovation and
implementation success in health care cost
reduction and quality gains. In 2006, he was the
first private sector purchaser specialist to be
elected to the Institute of Medicine.
Dr. Milstein was educated at Harvard
(BA-Economics), Tufts (MD) and UC-Berkeley
MPH-Health Services Evaluation and Planning).

**************
VBP: You have a unique perspective on
eliminating waste in the U.S. heathcare system.
Would you give us the “nutshell” version?
AM: In the broad context, we are experiencing
upward creep in the unaffordability of health
insurance…an average policy for a family of four
has grown from 15% to over 100% of annual
minimum wage earnings. This reflects health care
spending that steadily outgrows our Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) and income, mostly due
to the net cost additive effect of reliable treatment
innovations. This annual cost-additive effect
presents an increasing challenge because higherincome Americans are not stepping forward to ease
the burden for others. Given this scenario, we
need to do two jobs:
1. Eliminate the current level of waste or “fat”
2. Annually capture new efficiencies that are equal
to the cost-additive effect of valuable treatment
innovations.
How much of our current spending is “waste”?
Spending could be cut by 50% without any adverse
impact on the health care system (evidence from
the Dartmouth Atlas). If all American physicians
practiced with the same conservative resource use
as the most conservative and high quality physician
groups in the top performing regions (e.g., Seattle,
Minneapolis), 30-40% of current spending could be
eliminated without loss of quality or patient
satisfaction. Another 20-30% of spending could be
eliminated if the remaining services were delivered
at benchmark levels of cost per service.

monitor the effects of the improvements, and
rapidly standardize to the new process when it has
been improved. Health care needs to begin to work
this way. Without a well designed electronic
platform, rapid cycle testing and adoption of many
simultaneous service innovations is not possible.

VBP: What do you see as the broad, systemic
changes necessary for eliminating waste?
AM: We can eliminate >50% of the waste in the
system by taking the following sequential steps:
1.
Reduce service volume by 30% by
emulating the resource use patterns of the
best performing physician groups in the best
performing regions.
2.
Once service volume is brought under
control, work toward lowering unit prices for
services to the level of those in the lowest
cost, highest quality delivery systems.

Currently, only a handful of health care systems
(about 2% of the nation’s systems) “get it.” A few
examples are Inter-Mountain Healthcare System,
Virginia Mason, Mayo, Kaiser Permanente,
Vanderbilt, Duke, and Partners’ in Boston.
VBP: What role does the consumer play?

Note that, after eliminating all baseline waste, each
year of biomedical “miracles” adds 2-4% to health
care spending. This means that reengineering
must deliver a perpetual 2-4% annual efficiency
capture in order to prevent, rather than simply
postpone, affordability problems.

AM: Consumers can have a powerful effect on
any industry. Weak assertion of customer values
makes for poor performing industries. American
customers need to be educated on how to say “no”
to high prices without corresponding evidence of
superior quality and lower total longitudinal cost of
care.

VBP: We keep hearing that electronic medical
records (EMR) are part of the solution. Where
do they fit in your theory?

VBP: How can employers/purchasers of health
care influence the health care industry to make
the necessary changes?

AM: EMRs play an important role. Just taking
the paper out of health care by adopting freestanding EMRs will eliminate 3-4% of the waste in
the system. If EMRs become fully interoperable
(i.e., each provider’s system able to share patient
information with other providers’ systems) an
additional 3-4% of “fat” can be shaved.

AM: Focus on creating a “performance-sensitive”
market where the most leverage is – with individual
physicians. Physicians are the only ones who are
legally empowered to write orders for all categories
of health care resources, and they heavily influence
patient behavior. Even more important, no one has
greater ability to insist upon integration of ITenabled process engineering in hospitals and all
other facets of care delivery. Employers should
support only those insurers and/or business
coalitions that will deliver, report and incentivize
improvement in two measures for each physician.
1.
An aggregate quality metric, i.e., a single
specialty-relevant statistic for each
physician.
2.
An average total spending metric (i.e.,
average, case severity mix-adjusted, total
cost per episode-of-care and year-ofchronic-care) for patients primarily managed
by each physician.

But EMR’s are not a panacea. Like any industry
that aspires to world class levels of quality,
reliability and efficiency, health care needs an
electronic platform to test and rapidly implement
performance-enhancing service innovations.
The interesting question is, “Is there sufficient
management and IT expertise in health care to
enable robust and perpetual performance gains?”
World class, or even elementary, process
engineering skills are not taught substantively in
most medical or nursing schools.
In manufacturing and advanced service companies,
an electronic platform is used to design process
improvements, implement the improvements,
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To learn more about Dr. Milstein’s work, you may
contact him at the following:

Such a performance-sensitive market could
catalyze health industry transformation.

Arnold Milstein, MD, MPH
Three Embarcadero Center, Suite 1500
San Francisco, California 94111
(415) 743-8803
www.arnold.milstein@mercer.com

VBP: Is there evidence that these strategies will
be successful?
AM: The large Las Vegas gaming companies
and their union improved quality and reduced
health care spending by 10% relative to the
insurance trend over a 2-year period through such
an approach; and even greater progress is likely to
occur in their next phase.

Value of Business Coalitions in
Implementing

Another example is Massachusetts State
employees. Unlike Las Vegas, the state
employees are distributed over six different health
plans. The state persuaded health plans to merge
their claims data to enable more reliable physician
performance assessments, and each plan was
permitted to use its judgment with regard to
strategy(ies), i.e., tiering the network, limiting the
network, and/or P4P. In partnership with the
Massachusetts Medical Society and state
performance improvement leaders such as MHQP,
continuous refinements are underway.

Bridges to Excellence Programs
Adapted from an article by Andrew Webber, president
and chief executive officer of the National Business
Coalition on Health in Washington, D.C. NBCH (at
www.nbch.org) has a membership of nearly 90
employer-led coalitions in the United States,
representing more than 7,000 employers and 34 million
employees and their dependents.
In April of 2006, eight employers in Colorado
Springs (CO), representing 50,000 lives,
announced that they are participating in a Bridges
to Excellence (BTE) program
(www.bridgestoexcellence.org), a pay for
performance program that rewards physicians who
provide top quality care to patients. This program
is focused on helping to control the cost of diabetes
for employees and their dependents while
increasing the overall quality of health care for the
participants.

VBP: Your work has been described as
“motivating physicians to lead health industry
performance breakthrough.” How do you represent
your model for such changes graphically?
AM:
“A FEW SIMPLE RULES” to Speed Uptake
of Clinical Engineering
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The eight employers are members of the Colorado
Business Group on Health (CBGH), a non-profit
coalition based in Denver
(www.coloradohealthonline.org). They include the
City of Colorado Springs, Colorado College,
Colorado Springs School District #11, Colorado
Springs Utilities, El Paso County, Intel, Memorial
Health System, and Penrose-St. Francis Health
Services. David Lord, director of special projects
for Colorado College and chair of the CBGH
diabetes program, credits CBGH with the
successful launch of the program. “A large group

Low
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prevention initiatives. As a result of this multifaceted approach, the college anticipates a 4% rise
in its healthcare costs for the coming academic
year – a significant decrease from the 15% to 18%
annual increases the college experienced
previously.

such as CBGH gives employers more leverage in
negotiating with healthcare providers, insurance
companies, and health plans.”
In 2004, CBGH (a member of the National
Business Coalition on Health) worked with its
employer members to develop a program that
focused on diabetes among employees and their
dependents. The program goals included
increasing the rate of early detection of diabetes,
improving the amount and quality of diabetes
education offered, and improving benefit designs
for those with diabetes.

CBHG affords its members the opportunity to
discuss the problem of increasing healthcare costs
with other employers and to share successful
solutions. Lord says, “As a member of CBGH, we
can share best practices, review educational
materials used by other employers and buy
services for health screenings in bulk. It would be
much more difficult to accomplish these things as
an individual employer.”

The diabetes BTE program recently implemented in
Colorado Springs will reward physicians who meet
the standards for diabetes care from the National
Committee for Quality Assurance. These standards
encourage physicians to work in collaboration with
their patients to avoid the serious complications
that can result when diabetes is not managed
appropriately. Physicians who treat employees
and/or their dependents with diabetes will be
eligible for as much as $100 per patient per year if
standards are met.

BTE programs combined with wellness initiatives
can help to change the healthcare system from one
that reacts to illness to one that rewards healthy
behaviors. CBHG believes that this is the best way
to control healthcare costs in the long-term.

P4P “Primer”

The diabetes BTE program will also include
incentives for employees and their family members
with diabetes. For instance, beneficiaries may earn
up to $200 in cash for participating in wellness
activities such as joining a gym or completing a
health risk assessment.

Valerie Pracilio, BS and Janice Clarke, RN, BBA
Pay for performance (P4P) is a strategy that
rewards healthcare providers for improving the
quality and cost-effectiveness of care they deliver
to patients. P4P is viewed by many as a solution to
soaring healthcare costs, rising malpractice fees
and growing quality concerns. An increasingly
popular concept among businesses and health
plans, the Federal government is also beginning to
implement P4P initiatives via the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).

Donna Marshall, executive director of CBGH, says
the BTE program demonstrates what employers
can accomplish by working together. “The eight
employers in this diabetes BTE program are
expecting to see improvements in costs and quality
in the years to come. They also recognize that we
have to embrace a wide range of initiatives to get
the outcomes we need in terms of lower costs and
better health care.”

P4P is defined by the Leapfrog Group as “incentive
programs designated to overcome the limitations of
current reimbursement arrangements by aligning
financial rewards with improved outcomes.”1 P4P
programs set expectations, measure performance,
and present rewards based on the results.2 The
three primary objectives of P4P are:
 Creating a fair payment system,

Colorado College is one example of an employer
that uses a combination of strategies to contain
healthcare costs. Three years ago, the college
started a self-funded insurance program for its 600
employees and 1,500 covered lives. In subsequent
years the college added wellness and illness
Value-Based Purchasing Newsletter
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Creating financial incentives for improved
outcomes, and
Encouraging providers to add efficiency by
stretching financial resources.3


The key players in P4P are providers, payers and
the federal government. Commercial health plan
and government P4P programs exert pressure on
providers (i.e., physicians and specialists) to
perform well with respect to quality benchmarks
and to share their quality scores or rankings
publicly in order to receive financial incentive
payments.

In its recommendation to the Congress, MedPAC
asked that a portion of Medicare payments be
made to hospitals, physicians, home health
agencies, providers of dialysis patients, and
Medicare Advantage (MA) patients based on
quality.6 Another government agency, the United
States Department of Health and Human Services,
provides data sharing and a reporting mechanism
for hospital quality indicators.

According to Kaveh Safavi of Solucient (an
information products company that serves the
healthcare industry and maintains the nation’s
largest healthcare database), providers are most
concerned about the fairness of P4P payment
methods. Some payers (ie, healthcare insurance
companies) provide the P4P incentive payments to
physicians based on the magnitude of improvement
in performance on certain measures. Physicians
argue that providers who demonstrate high quality
pre- and post-implementation of P4P receive less
of an incentive than those whose performance went
from poor to good.

Medicare should, at minimum, get the best value
possible for the dollars spent.6 The rate set aside
by Medicare for P4P initiatives is 1-2% of current
payments per provider. Pay-for-performance will
alleviate one of Medicare’s historic problems – the
system makes equal payment to providers
regardless of the quality of care they deliver.1
Under a P4P program, provider payments will be
based on their ratings on a set of quality indicators.

In an article for Physician Executive, Lawrence Fink
describes P4P as a program that “disvalues
medical ethics.” He writes that P4P is driving
providers out of the system and leading to the
establishment of concierge service medicine.4
While Fink believes that the ethical components of
beneficence and non-maleficence are lacking in
P4P programs, others believe that there is nothing
unethical about offering incentives to physicians to
encourage good quality.

Summary: P4P is a strategy aimed at aligning
healthcare provider payments with the efficiency
and quality of care delivered. Specific quality
standards are set by the CMS, JCAHO, and
NCQA/HEDIS. Ongoing evaluation of P4P
programs will determine their effectiveness in
changing patterns of healthcare delivery and
improving quality.
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Although the U.S. healthcare system is more
advanced than other nations’, its considerable
resources are being used inefficiently. Among the
current initiatives to improve efficiency in health
care are:
 Rules of engagement for efficiency, established
by a collaborative effort among the Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ),
Bridges to Excellence and The Leapfrog
Group.5
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Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set
(HEDIS) measures for payers scheduled to be
introduced in 2008 by the National Committee
for Quality Assurance (NCQA.)
Cost-efficiency improvements envisioned by the
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission
(MedPAC), a Federal government initiative.
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Program Schedule
This e-journal, Value Based Purchasing, is a
product of The College for Advanced Management
of Health Benefits, a unique training program
designed to help employee benefit managers meet
the growing challenges of providing high quality
health benefits and managing rising benefit costs.
The College offers a practical, intensive program
that focuses on benefits purchasing techniques and
skills that emphasize improving the value, qualitycost ratio, and effectiveness of health care services
purchased on behalf of employees. The program is
a collaboration between the HealthCare21
Business Coalition in Tennessee, the National
Business Coalition on Health, and the Department
of Health Policy of Thomas Jefferson University.

AstraZeneca is a premiere sponsor of the College’s
2006 programs. Pfizer was the regional program
sponsor for the final program of 2006.

Three College sessions are currently planned for
2007:
March 19-21 in Las Vegas, NV
June 4-6 in Nashville, TN
September 24-26 in Columbus, OH
For more information, or registration materials,
please contact Jeannine Kinney, Program
Coordinator, at jeannine.kinney@jefferson.edu, or
215-955-1709.
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